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Efforts in Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Preliminary Lessons Learned

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PREFACE

In October 1993, the Academy for Educational Development's Research and Reference Services (R&RS) Project initiated an assessment of lessons learned from ethnic conflict resolution efforts for the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States Bureau. During the subsequent 12 months, the author spent approximately two months collecting data, researching, analyzing, and writing this report. The following 10 months were spent compiling more data, collecting both internal and external comments on the initial draft report, and finalizing this paper.

The study drew on the energies, goodwill, patience, and interest of many people -- a few deserving special acknowledgment. I am especially grateful for the assistance and guidance of Michele Wozniak-Schimpp, Diane Russell, and Mike Cacich from the R&RS project. Without their support, patience, and willingness to read numerous drafts of this study, this final report would be significantly deficient. I would like to thank the entire R&RS staff, especially Rachel Patterson, for their support and goodwill during this project.

In addition, Tim Meehan of the University of Pennsylvania, Dan Gibson of Texas A&M University, and Milt Essman and Ron Herring of Cornell University provided enthusiastic support and feedback. They pushed the author to toe the political theory-line more than she would have if left to her own devices.

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Summary

Background

Ethnic conflict resolution has become an issue for U.S. foreign policy, and has begun to have an increased impact on U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) programs and projects, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Although the promotion of ethnic conflict resolution is a novel concept for USAID, the Agency and other donors have had to deal with the impact of ethnic conflict on programs and projects for many years.

This paper will fulfill the following specific objectives:

- Identify and analyze relevant theories of ethnic conflict, conflict resolution, and ethnic conflict resolution;
- Identify and formulate lessons learned from USAID and other donor activity, and from academic, foundation, think-tank, and multilateral organizational sources;
- Suggest program and project options for USAID managers, missions, and policy makers.

Approach

A variety of sources were tapped in conducting the research for this paper, including USAID documents, documents from other donor and multinational organizations, case studies of countries with prevalent ethnic conflict, interviews with ethnic conflict and conflict resolution experts, and an extensive literature review including alternative information sources such as Internet. The preliminary findings were reviewed by USAID's ENI (Europe/New Independent States) Bureau and colleagues at USAID/PPC/CDIE. Final revisions were based on comments received from additional review by other USAID staff and by experts from outside the Agency.

Caveat

It was impossible to include, or even examine, the entire universe of ethnic conflict situations. Given the scope of work for this research project, country case examples were not explicitly solicited, and are included in this report only to elucidate theoretical and practical issues. Examination of existing case studies, analysis of specific USAID project development experience (looking at unintended consequences of development activities), and other relevant issues are potential subjects for future research.

Report Highlights

This report is divided into three major sections: the first provides an overview of various definitions of ethnicity and some of the theories for the origins of ethnic conflict; the second section reviews USAID projects and ethnic conflict literature for lessons learned and potential lessons learned; and the third section presents options for U.S. intervention in regions and countries around the world where ethnic conflict is prevalent. The major findings are featured below:

- The typology of ethnic conflict shows that there are physical, territorial, cultural, and political *categories of conflict*; *preconditions* focused on disparity of treatment and lack of legal access; and various *magnifier issues* that can ignite ethnic conflict fires. This typology is useful when examining ethnic conflicts and deciding upon a course of action for resolution.

- There are distinct *intervention opportunities* for U.S. agencies when addressing ethnic conflict. The Department of State should take the foreign policy lead when ethnic conflict has internationalized and violence has occurred. The Department of Defense should take the lead when military demobilization is needed. USAID should take the lead while the conflict is still domestic and violence has not yet erupted. Indeed, "preventive diplomacy" and "post-conflict reconstruction" easily fuse with traditional USAID projects and programs that concentrate on transforming relationships between ethnic groups through preventive actions and reconstruction. USAID can have a positive impact on ethnic conflict resolution both when violence has yet to become entrenched and after the violence has ended. USAID should work jointly with diplomatic organizations and agencies when the conflict internationalizes and, when the conflict becomes violent, it should act as an advisor.

- Three ethnic conflict strategy tables condense the various theories, lessons learned, and other ethnic conflict issues into a diagram relevant to USAID. The strategy tables are intended to give guidance to development policy and program/project professionals: when designing projects specifically to resolve ethnic conflict issues; when managing and evaluating projects and programs relevant to ethnic conflict resolution; and when examining other existing programs/projects for ethnic and conflict impact.

- Three major potential areas for USAID ethnic conflict project activity are programs that focus on preventing ethnic conflict, programs that address existing ethnic conflict, and programs that focus on post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, two major options for USAID intervention are tendered: direct intervention -- which would include programs and projects specifically geared towards ethnic conflict issues; and indirect intervention -- which would include suggestions for a Women in Development (WID)-like

approach to all USAID projects for ethnic issues and conditioning assistance based on ethnic conflict efforts.

Lessons Learned

This report identifies many lessons learned from practitioners in ethnic conflict analysis, conflict resolution, development, and more. Nine general lessons learned are identified and include:

- Avoid situations of high-intensity aggression where program success is unlikely.
- Limit conflict resolution efforts to peacemaking or diplomatic negotiation efforts once violence has broken out.
- Avoid "packaged" approaches to mediation.
- Place staff in the field as soon as possible.
- Allow ethnic communities to select conflict resolution trainees.
- Implement training through native speakers of the language.
- Consider both dominant and non-dominant groups, as well as the ways in which class, gender, race, and other variables affect perceptions of identity.
- Pay attention to ethnic conflict issues long after a specific dispute is resolved.
- Keep a long-term perspective when assessing results.

The report then identifies lessons learned in specific development-related areas, including political, economic growth, and education programs. While these areas are part of many donors' development portfolios, these lessons learned incorporate those programs that have been affected by ethnic conflict or have been designed to address ethnic conlict.

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Introduction

Since the end of World War II, there has been a marked increase in the number and severity of violent conflicts caused by ethnic tensions. According to the United Nations University and the University of Ulster, "of the 94 wars recorded between 1945 and 1988, 69 were intra-state conflicts" (INCORE 1993:3). For the same time period, more than 30 million people have died as a result of ethnic violence, the great majority of them civilians; and ethnic violence has created an estimated 29 million refugees or displaced persons -- a total that could rise to 100 million by the turn of the century (Ibid.). The costs of ethnic conflict are incalculable, but the Joint International Program on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) has estimated that the financial cost of a "low-level" conflict such as that in Northern Ireland reached around $9 billion between 1969 and 1982.

International activity in conflict resolution has been concentrated mainly at the nation-state level of response and, as a result, the focus has been on diplomatic efforts and negotiations. These efforts, which are built around the primacy of the "nation-state," have not been able to significantly reduce the prevalence of ethnic conflict (Saunders 1993b:1). Nevertheless, a multitude of theories and methodologies related to conflict resolution have received increasing attention from policy makers. International donors are now being asked by concerned governments, organizations, and individuals to sponsor efforts to address ethnic conflict, one of the most serious current threats to world peace.

This paper responds to the need for policy-makers in international development organizations to make difficult decisions on whether to attempt to resolve ethnic conflicts and how to do so. While this paper is not a long-term, evaluation-intensive research effort, it identifies key issues and summarizes lessons learned in conflict resolution and ethnic conflict. The paper does not attempt to review or analyze the entire universe of ethnic conflicts or the variety of conflict management options. Rather, the specific ethnic conflicts and conflict management practices discussed in this paper are simply illustrative. Successes and failures are likewise difficult to identify since activities in the field are either too recent to have been evaluated or are thought to be too unique for comparative measurement. At the initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Europe and the New Independent States (ENI) Bureau, this study begins to fill the void in evaluative information on lessons learned in ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. It is intended to analyze the experiential information that does exist so that it may be used in the design of ethnic conflict programs and the evaluation of conflict resolution proposals.

1. Overview of Issues in Ethnic Conflict Resolution

For a meaningful analysis of lessons learned in ethnic conflict resolution, it is necessary to define terms. There are, of course, many variables that influence the likelihood and degree of success or failure in conflict resolution. These variables can include historical context, international power struggles, geo-political concerns, access to and availability of resources, and more. Addressing all of these variables is beyond the scope of this paper, which will focus mainly on ethnicity as variable, both affecting and affected by conflict resolution. In other words, donors can encourage and support systemic conflict resolution measures that can reduce ethnic tensions and/or the salience of ethnic identities. Once terms are defined and issues elaborated, the second section of this paper focuses on specific lessons learned.

1.1. The Independent Variable: Ethnicity

1.1. What is Ethnicity?

At the conclusion of a long session on ethnic conflict held at the 1993 American Anthropological Association annual meeting, one session participant said that after hours of listening to the panelists, he was still unclear about the definition of ethnicity. He asked if ethnic identity is primordial (based on characteristics such as race, religion, language, and shared history) and therefore more fundamental and persistent than loyalties to larger social units such as states, or if ethnic identity is only salient when "invoked by political entrepreneurs" when there are clear competitive advantages attached to such an identity (Gurr 1993:1). Is ethnicity consciously and uniquely defined by each individual? The panel of experts failed to answer the question definitively by agreeing that *all* of these were valid definitions of ethnic identity, and that these differing definitions can mutually reinforce or contradict each other (Carment 1993:139).

Although experts are unable to resolve this theoretical debate, they do agree that the greater the competition and inequalities among ethnic groups in divided societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater the likelihood of ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993:2). The experts also agree that ethnic conflict is on the rise globally, and that ethnic conflict rivals the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces today (Maynes 1993:27) (INCORE 1993:10). This paper uses Saad Nagi's identification of five key characteristics that populations use to differentiate themselves (or are used by others to differentiate populations). These differentiations include language, race, religion, shared cultural values and symbols, and territory. Nagi further proposes that the larger the number of shared characteristics the stronger the ethnic identification, and that the strength of ethnic identification "is associated with differentials in laws and rules, division of labor, and/or in rates of residential and social mobility" (Nagi 1992:308). Drawing from the above definition, ethnic conflict typically occurs when any of a group's five ethnic characteristics are rejected, denigrated, or not respected by another group. It can be postulated that the intensity of the ethnic conflict, and therefore the level

of violence that may occur, is related to the number and strength of individual or group identification with the characteristic(s) being denied. Furthermore, "inter-ethnic conflict ... does not derive from immemorial hatreds, but rather from power struggles, which are worsened by the international system's definition of states as political communities with fixed borders" (Rubin 1993:47).

1.1.2. What Conditions Lead to Ethnic Conflict?

The literature distinguishes between two types of ethnic conflict: instrumentalist and affective. The first suggests that ethnic conflict occurs when there is competition for scarce opportunities mutually desired by groups within a society. Conflict is envisioned as the non-dominant group rebelling against real or imagined economic and/or political disparities between themselves and the dominant group (Meehan 1994:2). The second type argues the importance of affective variables in the formation of ethnicity and the explosion of ethnic conflict (Ibid.). Affective arguments stress the importance of identity and cultural uniqueness, emphasizing the tendency for ethnic conflict to occur as a clash of incompatibilities between or among more or less autonomous ethnic societies. The literature also highlights the importance of two distinct types of conditions leading to ethnic conflict. The first is the state in which diverse ethnic groups coexist. The second factor is what the literature calls *triggers*, or catalysts, for ethnic conflict. These two sets of conditions are described briefly below.

1.1.2.1. Relationship between Level of Development and Ethnic Conflict

The relationship between level of development and ethnic conflict is extremely complex. As states develop politically and economically, they produce different types of ethnic conflict. Stephen Ryan has characterized ethnic conflict according to the three types of states. In the **first world,** the democratically mature West, an "ethnic revival has taken place, a development characterized by a new found assertiveness among various minority ethnic groups" (Ryan 1990:x). These groups include the Basques and Catalans of Spain, the Bretons and Corsicans in France, and the Welsh and the Scots in the United Kingdom. In the **third world**, states have inherited artificial borders that do not reflect pre-existing cultural divisions and frequently experience serious ethnic violence as they struggle to adjust to a post-colonial political process. Such ethnic conflicts seem to have proliferated since the 1960s, when the process of decolonization reached its height. There have been bitter and protracted conflicts in the Congo, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Cyprus. In the **second world**, with the liberation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a period of "renewed" ethnic conflict is the main focus of interstate politics. It seems that in the past, the "imposition of Soviet hegemony" over these states had kept ethnic conflict from being expressed openly (Ryan 1990:xi). Indeed, as ethnic groups have found their voices in the democratic politics of post-cold-war Europe, they are increasingly raised in favor of self-determination (Maynes 1993:126).

TABLE 1: Various Hypotheses of Ethnic Conflict Resolution

THEORIES of ETHNIC CONFLICT	DESCRIPTION	CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FACTOR(S)	PROBLEMS
Social Structure Explanation[1]	The structure of society shapes the salience of ethnic identity, and the intensity of the competition between groups	Looks for links and common interests among competing groups in order to change patterns of behavior: - *focuses on winners and losers* - *the distribution of benefits is important* - *emphasizes rules of the game (therefore constitutional arrangements are important)*	This explanation is better at predicting likely opponents in a conflict than in determining if the conflict will occur in the first place.
Psychocultural, Psychohistoric Explanation	Cultural and historical factors shape ethnic identity, and the resulting perceptions of conflict between groups	Focuses on process, and looks for shared understandings of the world: - *third-party mediation effort could include the need to apologize for unrepresented party activities in the conflict* - *addresses perceived historic grievances*	This explanation is useful for understanding the motivations of individual workshop participants, but can have limited application to the rest of the community.
(not important)	Understanding ethnicity, or the context of the conflict, is irrelevant to efforts to resolve the conflict	Conflict resolution techniques and measures can be universally applied: - *relies on various workshop formats in an attempt to alter mutual negative interpretations of the parties*	The lack of concern over explanations of conflict can lead to inappropriate and risky mediation activities.
Mixed	Understanding the structural or cultural influences on ethnicity is important	Some conflict resolution techniques and measures can be universally applied, but they must be modified to the specific context of the conflict	This explanation is good at individualizing intervention activities, but many interveners resist making comparisons to other conflicts and oppose collecting lessons learned information.

[1] Marc Howard Ross discusses the social structure school of thought in his 1994 draft paper on the various theories and approaches to ethnic conflict management.

In an article entitled "Containing Ethnic Conflict," Charles William Maynes points out that "whether democracy favors reactionary nationalism or progressive pluralism depends largely on the **economy**" (Maynes 1993:155). He argues that citizens in East-Central Europe are living in a depression that would test even West European democracies. Political leaders often deliberately exacerbate the problem, exploiting economic suffering by promising to slow economic reforms. If that strategy fails, political parties often retrench into nationalist positions and search for scapegoats (Maynes 1993:76). Thus, ethnic nationalist movements are often inspired and led by political parties in order to obtain or maintain power and to shift attention from social and economic issues to ethnic issues (Maynes 1993:155).

1.1.2.2. Functional Explanations for Ethnic Conflict

In "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict," John Coakley presents a useful typology of ethnic conflict, distinguishing among four branches of conflict:

- **Physical** -- conflict between the nation-state and non-dominant groups for physical survival;
- **Territorial** -- conflict over national boundaries and the frontiers of the ethnically non-dominant group;
- **Cultural** -- conflict between the culture (especially language), institutions, and symbols of the nation-state and those of the ethnically non-dominant group; and
- **Political** -- conflict between the objectives of the nation-state and the ethnic group in terms of the overall program for ethnic conflict resolution (Coakley 1992).

At the community level, a review and analysis of ethnic conflict literature reveals that there are common preconditions for ethnic conflict that exist to varying degrees in most countries. These preconditions can be found in rural and urban settings, and in developed and developing countries. They are found in long established democracies as well as new democratic states and non-democratic states. These preconditions can include: (1) citizenship disputes (e.g., residency before a certain year); (2) language issues; (3) conflicts over land; (4) religious disputes; (5) inequities in political participation; (6) economic disparities; and (7) decentralization. The presence of these seven major preconditions can ignite ethnic conflict, given the proper *magnifier*, when there are changes in the accepted status quo or "social contract" between groups -- and groups and governments.

In "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," Renee de Nevers (1993:34) ignores the issue of democracy and economic development, and looks instead to other factors influencing whether states experience ethnic conflict. She argues that states with ethnic conflict are similar in the following ways: (1) they possess smaller ethnic groups that have ties across national borders, creating external allies in their domestic disputes; (2) they have strong stereotypical views of other ethnic groups; and (3) they maintain extremist ethnic positions

that are used in intra-ethnic political competition. De Nevers' factors, however, seem to suggest a level of intensity of the conflict, rather than explain how ethnic conflict originates.

1.1.2.3. Magnifiers for Ethnic Conflict

The Department of Justice examined the incidence of ethnic conflict in the United States and developed a "two tap-root theory" showing that violent ethnic conflict arises from two factors associated with the behavior of the nation-state: **disparity of treatment** and **the lack of non-dominant group's confidence in the redress systems**. With regard to disparity of treatment, members of the non-dominant group are perceived as unwelcome in their community regions; preferential treatment for any non-dominant group is the cause of resentment among other sectors of society. Second, regarding the confidence that non-dominant groups and individuals have in the system, if non-dominant groups believe that the system is unable to address inequities in areas such as health, employment, and social services, there is no recognized alternative to conflict. The Department of Justice report concluded that, in the United States, if these two magnifiers exist, all that is needed for violence is a triggering incident (Cardenas 1993:3).

Changes in the accepted status quo or social contract can occur when an ethnic group's or groups' resentments over a factor has built up over time and finally reached a critical point, or a triggering incident serves as a spark to ignite action and reaction which focuses on pre-existing conditions. For example, the arrest of Rodney King triggered the Los Angeles Riots in 1992. In this case, factors included economic disparity, which was magnified by a fear of lack of legal redress. A focus on the triggering incident, however, fails to take into account the broader, and more explanatory, picture needed to understand ethnic conflict. Rather, an understanding of the existing factors and their relationship to the seven preconditions paints a more realistic picture of ethnic conflict.

Failure to deal with a precondition or factor can escalate into ethnic conflict and violence even without a triggering incident. For example, a conflict that began with a demand of the Tamil for equal and non-discriminatory treatment with respect to language and employment opportunities expanded into demands for a federal state and then later exploded into a demand for a separate state (Business Times 1993:2). Violence became the main expression of Tamil "extremists" as the Sri Lankan political system failed to deal with the earliest preconditions and factors of the conflict.

Preconditions and factors are likewise salient in situations where there is no social contract or accepted status quo. In these (perhaps "transitional") situations, where there is a high degree of uncertainty and fear, any change (and all changes) could ignite ethnic conflict. In this case, preconditions become even more important and policy-makers and donors should be even more sensitive to the seven preconditions.

When examining ethnic conflicts and deciding upon a course of action for resolution, it is useful to ask several key questions. Figure 1 suggests a typology of theoretical explanations of ethnic conflict that serve to direct these questions. Following Figure 1, the initial

question to be asked is, what are the factors that characterize a particular ethnic conflict or can lead to ethnic conflict: is it territorial (land title problems for the ethnically non-dominant), cultural (religious tolerance), political (citizenship requirements), or physical survival (employment opportunities)? The next question examines the magnifiers of the conflict: how much disparity of treatment, how much are some ethnic groups discriminated against and other groups not as much, or are all individuals of the state discriminated against? Furthermore, if there is gross disparity of treatment, is a viable legal redress system in place? If the answers to these two major questions are "yes" and "no" respectively, then a triggering incident can spark violent ethnic conflict.

1.2. The Dependent Variable: Conflict Resolution

1.2.1. Conflict Resolution Defined

This review of the literature on conflict resolution has found that there is no single, generally accepted definition of or methodology for conflict resolution. For the purposes of this paper, however, conflict resolution is determined to be the "nonviolent process for relationship building, collaborative problem solving, and dialogue to lay the groundwork for productive negotiation" (Gutlove, et al. 1992:9).

1.2.1.1. Relationship between Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution, "ethnic conflict resolution"

Although there is an abundance of literature on ethnic conflict and a plethora of material on conflict resolution, there is relatively little on the relationship between ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. There seems to be a division between those who study ethnic conflict and those who look at ways to reduce it. This separation has had a negative impact on the study of conflict resolution (Horowitz 1985:568). Ethnic conflict resolution is approached in this paper as a **subset** of conflict resolution, with its own particular and unique strategies and methodologies derived from the conflict resolution field in general. This approach, however, is not supported by many conflict resolution professionals who feel that experience with conflict resolution at the family level can be readily applied even to violent ethnic conflict, as exemplified in Eastern Europe.

1.2.2. Levels of Conflict Resolution Activity

What the experts do agree on is that there are different **levels** of conflict resolution. According to Joyce Neu at Emory University's Carter Center, there are three levels of conflict resolution:

- **Conflict Management** -- dominant groups or actors accept some sort of solution, which may or may not have the support of all the parties to the conflict. Neu suggests that this level only suppresses or side-tracks conflict until significant political, economic or societal changes bring it to the forefront of national interests;

- **Conflict Settlement** -- all sides of the conflict agree to some sort of solution, usually formulated in a peace treaty, but the underlying issues are not addressed; and

- **Conflict Resolution** -- the outcome is satisfactory to all and the underlying issues are addressed.

Neu notes that conflicts often take time to be truly resolved, and that there are no quick solutions, whether developed internally or imposed from outside. Furthermore, there is no standard formula that will ensure the prevention of future ethnic conflicts (de Nevers 1993:44). And Horowitz notes that it is not really necessary to "resolve" ethnic conflict in order to do something about it (Horowitz 1985:564). Each of these three levels is described in greater detail below.

1.2.2.1. Management Strategies for Conflict Resolution

In historical terms disputes can and have been managed through a variety of methods -- some with dire ethical and moral implications. These strategies include: indigenization, accommodation, group rights, non-territorial autonomy or national cultural autonomy, assimilation, population transfers, frontier adjustment, and genocide (Coakley 1992:346-52). More concretely, Hirschoff and Maynes identify six examples of political programs that have been tried in particular cases to reduce or preempt ethnic conflict:

- **Equal Participation in Government** -- all parties share equally in both appointed positions and elected positions.

  In 1988, *Burundi* created an ethnically-diverse cabinet,
  In *Uganda* the government included participation by all ethnic groups (Hirschoff 1991:12).

- **No Participation in Government** -- the major parties agree not to participate in government because they realize that such participation will cause ethnic conflict.

  In *Sierra Leone* the two largest groups intentionally divorce themselves from political power to avoid rivalry (Ibid.).

- **Proportionality** -- ethnic conflict is "tamped down" by a proportional division of key offices.

  In *Belgium* each ethnic group was assured a certain number of key positions (Maynes 1993:31).

- **Agreed Outcomes** -- ethnically non-dominant group conflict is reduced through a political process of negotiated outcomes where, regardless of election results, the numerically weaker parties know that they will have a voice in national politics.

  In *Austria* and *Malaysia* political parties make pre- or post-election deals that accord the defeated parties a place at the table (Ibid.).

- **Mutual Vetoes** -- ethnically non-dominant groups are reassured by a system in which no decision can be made without the major parties' agreement.

  In *Austria* civil peace has been sought by such a system (Ibid.)

- **"Purposive Depoliticization"** -- the stronger groups willingly make major concessions to the weaker parties.

  In *Switzerland* even though the Protestant majority won the civil war in 1847, it made major concessions to the defeated Catholics by offering equal representation even though some of their districts were smaller (Ibid.).

- **Tacit Agreement** -- one group controls the government and another the economy.

  In many Asian countries ethnic Chinese and Indians run the economy while indigenous groups hold political power (Hirschoff 1993:12).

1.2.2.2. Conflict Settlement and Resolution Strategies

There is considerable disagreement in the literature on whether conflicts can ever be resolved definitively unless one group disappears, leaves, goes underground, or is assimilated entirely. According to Mark Appel in "Developing Constructive Approaches for Confronting Seemingly Intractable Conflicts," there are disputes that cannot be resolved definitively because of ethical, political, or sociological value differences (Appel 1993:1). One characteristic of conflicts based on value differences is that they tend to be very public. "The parties need to make their requirements, their interests, and their positions known publicly" (Ibid.). The implication is that it will be difficult for ethnic group leaders to contradict their public statements, even if they desire some degree of conflict resolution. Another characteristic of value-driven ethnic conflict is that these conflicts are often "intractable." The cause of the conflict is often unresolved when the negotiators and decision makers go home. Workable solutions are often difficult to find because not every viewpoint can be represented at the negotiating table. No matter how tightly a solution is defined, there is always someone, some group, that feels excluded based on value differences. Finally, John Richardson concurs that "many ethnic conflicts may be manageable, but not resolvable" (Richardson 1992:12).

The likelihood of failure is heightened even more when the conflict is based on differences of identity. As Jenonne Walker notes, "power and material benefits can be shared. In the eyes of many, a conflicting sense of identity is irreconcilable" (J. Walker 1993:104). For example, in South Tyrol German-speaking Austrians lived for many years under an Italian government that gave them the right to their own ethnic identity -- *as long as they identified themselves as Italians*. It took years of negotiation and an agreement allowing South Tyrol

autonomy, before the German self-identified community was officially allowed to conduct business and education in German. Success in settlement or resolution is more likely and takes less time when the dispute is over concrete, quantifiable interests, such as land, water, economic benefits, or political power. On the other hand, in South Tyrol both Italian and German communities were integrated to some degree, and the resolution of their conflict was managed in the absence of extensive value incompatibilities.

Finally, the approach chosen to address conflict resolution reflects the academic discipline and/or field experience of those involved in mediation attempts. There are anthropological, psychological, political, humanistic, historical, and diplomatic approaches. When deciding upon the disciplinary approach or approaches to mediation, the type of dispute is likely to be an important consideration. For example, if we accept John Coakley's categorization of disputes into four categories -- physical, territorial, cultural, and political -- certain disciplinary approaches may be better suited to certain types of disputes. For territorial disputes, diplomatic, historical, and political science approaches hold particular promise. For cultural disputes, the anthropological, humanistic, and psychological approaches would be more appropriate. Unfortunately, very little empirical evidence is available to measure the success of any of these approaches. [2] Because most conflicts are complex, the input of more than one discipline is needed to resolve them.

1.2.2.3. Diplomatic versus Developmental Conflict Resolution

Diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution fall into four useful categories:

(1) **preventive diplomacy**, addressing tensions before they erupt into violence or concrete opposition political positions;

(2) **peace making,** which can include negotiation and mediation efforts usually involving, but not limited to, high-level diplomacy;

(3) **peace keeping**, which implies the potential threat of force by an international actor; and,

(4) **post-conflict reconstruction**.

The principal opportunities for donors appear to be in the first and last categories, since experts generally agree that it is impossible -- or at least extremely risky -- to intervene effectively until the conflicts have spent themselves (Brown & Schraub 1992:204; de Nevers 1993:33; Maynes 1993:124).

[2] As of this writing, Bryn Mawr and Haverford Colleges are involved in a study of conflict resolution practices. Results of the study are expected sometime in 1995.

However, Gutlove notes that there is a fundamental difference between conflict resolution efforts and traditional diplomatic efforts. "It is crucial for ... deep-seated conflicts to employ conflict resolution processes that help the participants to acknowledge each other's needs for identity, recognition, security, and equity. Traditional diplomatic efforts do not place a primary focus on these needs as their goal is usually finding formulas for agreement, not transforming the relationship between the conflicting parties" (Gutlove et al., 1992:2). This disparity has been recognized by experts involved in conflict situations and has generated a two-track diplomatic approach to conflict resolution.

Traditional diplomatic efforts, also called Track I diplomacy, concentrate on formal negotiation of international disputes by individuals who represent a government or intergovernmental organizations. Track I diplomacy assumes that each ethnic group is represented by a single set of cohesive leaders who themselves represent governments or quasi-government organizations (Horowitz 1985:574). An example of Track I diplomacy is the Camp David Accords engineered by U.S. President Carter. On the other hand, Track II, or unofficial mediation, can sometimes be a more viable alternative to Track I diplomacy because it moves the debate away from power-based (government) relations towards problem solving, voluntary agreement and communication building (Mawlawi 1992:397). Unofficial mediation is usually defined as mediation in international or intra-national disputes by individuals who are not employed by or responsible to either a national government or an intergovernmental organization (Mawlawi 1992:397). Most commonly, the mediation process in Track II diplomacy centers on non-government organization (NGO) participation. An example of Track II diplomacy is the Lutheran World Federation work with representatives of the Guatemalan government and the opposition Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity party which resulted in a 1990 accord "which then became the basis for formal peace negotiations between the conflicting parties" (Mawlawi 1992:398).

Preventive diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction, however, do not fit easily into traditional diplomatic nomenclature and processes. For example, a review of both Track I and Track II literature reveals common use of terms such as "diplomacy," "negotiation," and "mediation". In contrast, preventive diplomacy literature and post-conflict reconstruction materials commonly use terms such as "program," "monitoring," "evaluating" and "training". It seems, therefore, that both preventive diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction could be categorized as a "Track III" in dispute techniques. Indeed, they fit most easily into donor nomenclature of projects and programs which concentrate on transforming relationships between ethnic groups through preventive actions (education, legal systems reform, civil society, employment and others) and reconstruction efforts.

Table 2 clarifies these concepts by depicting a hypothetical intervention framework for USAID[3]. It suggests that USAID, the U.S. Department of State (DOS), and other donors, can have a positive impact on ethnic conflict resolution both when violence has yet to

[3] Table 1 incorporates some concepts included in Stephen Ryan's ethnic conflict resolution framework developed in his book *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, (Dartmouth: Brookfield, 1990), pp. 52-53.

become de rigueur and after the violence has ended. Another variable that plays an important role is the internationalization of the conflict. The conflict can be considered to be internationalized when it has drawn the attention of regional powers or other international spheres of power through media attention, commitment of resources (including human, e.g., government negotiators), or through spilling over international boundaries. The target group of the conflict resolution activity is an important variable which can direct donor endeavors. Thus, USAID and other donors can have a leading role when the conflict is still mostly a domestic matter, work jointly with diplomatic organizations and agencies when the conflict internationalizes, and act as advisors when the conflict becomes violent, and play a leading role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

TABLE 2: Hypothetical U.S. Intervention Framework

ETHNIC CONFLICT STATUS	INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	TARGET GROUP	ACTIVITY FOCUS	INTERVENTION TYPE
Pre-conflict: When there are tensions between ethnic groups, and the issues are still mostly a *domestic* matter	USAID, NGOs & PVOs	- Ordinary people - Communities - Decision-makers	Projects/programs aimed at socio-economic activity (peace building)	TRACK III
Conflict exists: When the conflict is still mostly a *domestic* matter	USAID, NGOs, PVOs & DOS	- Decision-makers - Leaders - Ordinary people	Projects/programs aimed at political activity (peace-making)	TRACK III
Mature conflict: When the conflict has *internationalized*, but there is little or no violence	USAID, NGOs, PVOs & DOS	- Decision-makers	Projects/programs, mediation & diplomacy (peace-making)	TRACK II, TRACK I
Violent conflict: When the conflict has internationalized, and there is *violence*	DOS, DOD[4], NGOs & Multilateral Organizations	- Armed groups - Decision-makers - Refugees	Mediation, diplomacy, negotiations, policies (peace-keeping)	TRACK I, TRACK II
Post conflict: When the violent conflict has *terminated*	USAID, NGOs & PVOs, DOS, DOD, Multilateral Organizations	- All of the above targets	Projects, programs, mediation (reconstruction)	TRACK III

[4] U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

1.3. Conflict Resolution and Democracy

1.3.1. Relationship between ethnic conflict resolution and democracy

One of the major considerations for any type of U.S. involvement in the resolution of ethnic conflict, is the realization that the often contradictory relationship between democracy programs and ethnic conflict programs may test the effectiveness of both. A 1993 UNDP report on Kenya stated baldly that the "principal causes of the violence in the past two years are directly and unequivocally related to the ongoing process of democratization" (Richburg 1994:1). Indeed, Rothstein agrees that democratic procedures may actually provoke domestic conflicts [5] if democratic procedures encourage politicians to manipulate ethnic and communal conflicts for their own benefits -- that is, if they encourage ethnic or other groups to organize in pursuit of their own interests instead of promoting national unity (Rothstein 1992:24). As participation in the democratic process increases:

- increasing demands on the system can overwhelm ethnically non-dominant group issues and views (for example, as more citizens turn towards the legal system for redress, the courts become overburdened and unable to respond to demand);

- the number of contending views also increases -- for example, as each ethnic group forms its own political party or associations and begins to advocate for its members' interests, this trend can overwhelm politicians and promote what some analysts call "demosclerosis," or the inability of the system to promote many interests as participation in the democratic process increases; and

- entrenched elites become concerned about losing control over their traditional spheres of influence, and respond by undermining the democratic process itself. For example, as political parties expand, the government may respond by gerrymandering district lines to maintain their dominant ethnic group's majority representation.

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[5] Effective democratic institutions can prevent ethnic conflict from erupting in political tensions that can sicken the body politic and cause violence. John Richardson identified six political issues which can undermine democracy and contribute to ethnic conflict: (1) **expertise versus accountability**, or how to develop specialized technical knowledge while implementing systems of accountability that will resist the "universal predisposition of policy elites to 'advance their own narrow interests in the name of the public good and succumb to the temptations of power'"; (2) **growth versus equity**, or how to devise safety nets that respond to the rising and potentially destabilizing aspirations of the disadvantaged created by economic growth; (3) **public order versus human rights**, or how public order can be maintained in the face of destabilizing forces that may include organized armed militants, while protecting human rights; (4) **realities of power versus the need for reform**, or how to implement political and economic reforms that realize the promise of democracy if those reforms also require that dominant elites relinquish some of their power; (5) **short-term versus long-term payoffs**, or how to persuade citizens, particularly marginalized communities, to make further sacrifices in the hope of rationalizing national economies and achieving sustainable economic development in the future; and (6) **national identity versus communal identity**, or how to manage conflicts between communal and national identities where communal groups are intermingled with each other and with other groups outside national boundaries (Richardson 1990:13-5).

1.3.2. Major issues germane to discussions of ethnic conflict and democracy

Many theorists have examined the characteristics and elements of various types of democracy for how they contribute to or diminish ethnic conflict. Although an in-depth discussion of all the permutations of democracy is beyond the scope of this paper, there are two major issues with particular relevance to ethnic conflict, namely consociational democracy and civil society.

Consociational democracies are characterized by multiparty cabinets, a multiparty system, proportional representation, political decentralization, and written constitutions that recognize certain **non-dominant group rights** (Ryan 1990:16). Consociation rests on different democratic principles from the traditional Westminster majoritarian model -- that of coalition building. According to Maynes, "consociational democracy" is much more appropriate for ethnically or religiously driven conflicts because it offers greater accommodation to group rights and more protection to those who feel vulnerable in a majoritarian system (Maynes 1993:32) (Lijphart 1977:25-44). The past relationship between groups and the history of a group's views regarding individual as opposed to communal rights are both variables in understanding the philosophical history of non-dominant groups. Such an understanding of non-dominant (or dominant) groups' concept of "rights" helps to explain how political legitimacy is created. If societies value group rights over individual rights, then consociational democracy may be a better development choice for those societies.

Civil society can play an important role in ethnic conflict resolution by providing a political voice for non-dominant groups outside of the official political process. Defined as the political space between the individual and government, civil society [6] is usually expressed as membership in NGOs, informal social groups, associations, chambers of commerce, and other organizations which advocate political representation of their members. Civil society can also serve to keep ethnically non-dominant groups' issues and views alive after elections have taken place by continuing the political debate even if the ethnic group has failed to achieve a majority (Creative Associates 1993:6). Likewise, people who do not choose to vote in elections can still participate through issue awareness and local self-help groups organized by civil society organizations.

Finally, if "the best school for democracy is democracy itself" (Gasiorowski et al., 1990:7-8), then the best way to promote ethnic conflict resolution is through democratic processes, no matter how diminished those processes may be (Rothstein 1992). Although democratic processes may contribute to ethnic conflict, the superiority of nondemocratic regimes is not implied. Indeed, there is evidence that ethnic groups are more willing to sacrifice

[6] For a more detailed discussion of civil society, see Harry Blair's, et al., report "Civil Society and Democratic Development: A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper." This paper was written as part of a USAID global evaluation of donor efforts to promote civil society. Field studies included Chile, El Salvador, Kenya, Bangladesh and Thailand -- all societies in transition, and many experiencing ethnic clashes. A final synthesis report on USAID's evaluation of civil society has been prepared by Gary Hanson, PPC/CDIE/E/POA, at the time this paper was completed.

immediate material benefits for a greater say in choosing their rulers and having more protected rights (Rothstein 1992:26). Horowitz' argument goes even further, stating that "the case for policy intervention is strong [in dealing with] internal political arrangements," and recommending intervention measures that avert the "crystallization of ethnic allegiances ... and encourage alignments that reach across the great cleavages that can rend a society" (Horowitz 1985:682).

Whether donors chose to support consociational arrangements, which can tend to reinforce ethnic identity, or chose to support the creation of cross-cutting cleavages, which tend to undermine ethnic identity, it is clear that either policy intervention is extremely risky and could backfire and encourage ethnic conflict. Indeed, "it can be taken as a given that development interventions, no matter how well designed and implemented, cannot provide wholly equitable results -- in both absolute and relative terms" (Gibson 1994:2). This choice between consociational arrangements and the creation of cross-cutting cleavages is the subject of great controversy within both the academic community and the development community.

2. Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Ethnic Conflict Resolution

This section describes principal lessons learned by individuals and organizations that have worked in conflict resolution and ethnic conflict. It is divided into three parts. The first provides a brief summary of the experiences from which the lessons are derived. The second section describes general and over-arching lessons learned in conflict resolution. The third section provides sector-specific lessons according to the following sectoral categories: political development, economic growth, and education.

2.1. USAID and other Experience

A review and analysis of ethnic conflict resolution literature reveals a dearth of evaluative information. Many organizations seem too busy to review what they have accomplished, preoccupied with more immediate activities such as attending conferences, conducting seminars, setting up training programs, sponsoring civic education television programs, and other hands-on activities. Other organizations consciously determine that any analysis of methodology or activity is meaningless. They argue that all ethnic conflicts are unique and therefore are not good subjects for comparison and review. The Quakers in particular hold the philosophical view that outcomes are not important and that the process itself is the goal. Quaker peacemaking activities are not guided by "experimental controls, statistical inference, mathematical models, and all the other accoutrements of scientific inquiry" (Yarrow 1978:xviii). Therefore, the identification of relevant, programmatic, and contextual lessons learned for use by USAID proved difficult.

However, with the multitude of academic and think tank interest in ethnic conflict, conflict resolution in general, and ethnic conflict resolution in particular, it is possible to identify general themes and extract numerous lessons learned. The majority of materials

concentrate on historical overviews of conflict areas, diplomatic actions, or conflict resolution training activities. Only rarely do authors examine donor activities, and typically these works focused on the influence of ethnic conflict on discrete development projects.[7] Indeed, Donald Horowitz believes that it is notoriously difficult to measure the actual consequences of policies and programs in this field (Horowitz 1985:579).

Analysis of USAID project documentation reveals that USAID has funded studies of ethnic issues concerning:

- **Ethnic Minorities** in *South Vietnam* (PDABA654 and PDABA786), *Belize* (PNABI653), *Mauritania* (PNABH496), and the *Bolivian lowlands* (PNAAW491),
- **Ethnicity and Voting Districts** in a large number of countries (PNABP360),
- a **Historic Case Study** of *Iran, Afghanistan, the Sudan*, and *Brazil* (PNAAH736), and
- a **Report to USAID** policy makers on how to deal with **Ethnic Conflict** in *Developing Countries* (PNAAQ292)[8].

In all of USAID's experience, only three projects that deal specifically with ethnic issues were supported by evaluation reports.[9] Of the three projects, one was a 1969-1974 language and training project in South Vietnam (Contract number 730-11-995-335); the second was a 1976-1980 project to provide bilingual training to 13 ethnic groups in Bolivia (project number 511-0460); and the third was a 1987-1990 Crisis Care project to promote a non-racial society in South Africa (Grant Agreement No. 647-0305-G-SS-7083-00).

World Bank projects were also reviewed; however, only two World Bank studies were directly related to ethnic issues: an examination of the relationships between ethnicity, education and earnings in Bolivia and Guatemala (Document number WPS1014), and a paper exploring educational policies in Kenya (Document number WDP0065).

A similar examination of the projects and documents of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

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[7] The British government was considering releasing an evaluation of their ethnic conflict resolution project in South Africa, but had not made this decision by the time this paper was completed.

[8] This document, by Donald L. Horowitz (titled "Ethnicity and Development: Policies to Deal with Ethnic Conflict in Developing Countries," the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, March 1981) focuses on federalism, electoral systems and preference programs as mechanisms for conflict reduction.

[9] This contention is based upon an exhaustive review of materials contained in USAID's Development Information System, containing descriptions of projects and the most comprehensive source of Agency sponsored research, project documentation, and other USAID literature.

revealed that most other government development organizations have usually dealt with ethnic issues only as they affect projects. Two exceptions stand out. First, the Asian Development Bank has a project to "eliminate inequalities among the ethnic groups and regions of Malaysia" (PE-184). Second, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation has funded a study of socio-cultural factors that affect development projects (QA '90-48). [10]

Lessons learned from the documents identified above, organizations, and experiences are summarized in the sections below. First, general lessons and overarching issues are presented. Second, lessons unique to particular development sectors, hence specific types of activities, are organized accordingly.

2.2. General Lessons

There are several important lessons in ethnic conflict and conflict resolution that have broad implications for a number of types of programs. Principal lessons are as follows:

- **Avoid situations of high-intensity aggression where program success is unlikely**. International institutions, as currently organized and operated, are not able to deal with local, high-intensity aggression. Moreover, to date there are no concrete solutions to the problem of how to resolve conflict and prevent the fragmentation of former communist states (Maynes 1993:118). Finally, according to Rene Lemarchand, "Where cultural affinities transcend national boundaries and serve as 'poles of attraction' for the intervention of outside forces" or as a pretext for retaliation against non-dominant groups in neighboring states, successful conflict resolution becomes very difficult (Lemarchand 1993:3).

- **Limit conflict resolution efforts to Track I and Track II diplomatic efforts once violence has broken out.** If violent conflict has broken out, negotiating a successful ethnic peace accord, without military victory on one side, will be impossible until the conflicts have spent themselves (Maynes 1993:124; de Nevers 1993:33; Brown/Schraub 1992:204). This view is contradicted by those who believe that successful interventions can occur at any time during the conflict, including after violence has broken out. Any hope of a positive intervention will require third party intervention (Track I and Track II diplomacy). The third party should be substantially more powerful than any protagonist, should have a strong interest in reaching an accord, and should be willing to commit substantial resources to implementing its provisions (Richardson 1993:11).

[10] Documentation from these projects has not been made available to CDIE.

- **Avoid "packaged" approaches to mediation**. Some mediators are producing packages and trying to sell them to people and organizations. According to the Quakers, mediation is a process and requires specific expertise in the local or regional situations, languages, history, and political context -- all of which a packaged "boiler-plate" product would not be able to provide (Williams 1992:20). Practitioners must be cautious of general guidelines, as the wise application of general principles will vary from case to case (J. Walker 1993:104).

- **Place staff in the field as soon as possible**. International field staff outposted in the "affected" area are critical, and the sooner they are in place, the more effective they are likely to be (Levinson 1993:13). The success of a conflict resolution effort is greatly enhanced if conflict management begins before there is an explicit dispute to mediate (J. Walker 1993:105).

- **Implement training through native speakers of the language**. The best kind of conflict resolution training has to be conducted by professionals with international experience, who speak the native language and are able to use local examples, knowledge, and understanding to make their teaching more effective. At the very least, interpreters have to be trained in conflict resolution terminology (USAID 1981:17) (Patrushev 1993:40).

- **Let ethnic communities select conflict resolution trainees**. Trainees are of better quality when selected by their own communities; allowing communities to select participants can increase post-training participant/community involvement through the transference of principles learned to the other community members (USAID 1981:18).

- **Consider both dominant and non-dominant groups, as well as the ways that class, race and other variables affect perceptions of identity**. For example, in Sri Lanka the majority Sinhalese, who outnumber the Tamils by 6:1, consider themselves and act as if they are a non-dominant group. When the Tamils of Sri Lanka state are viewed in the context of the Tamils of all of South Asia, Tamils of South Asia outnumber the Sinhalese found only in Sri Lanka by 4:1 (de Silva 1986:362).

- **Monitor ethnic conflict issues long after a specific dispute is resolved**. International efforts that attempt to improve relations between communities and ease tensions among ethnic groups should not stop when a specific dispute is resolved or an election has been monitored (Walker 1993:105). Post-conflict reconstruction efforts should focus on rebuilding the physical plant and institutional infrastructure necessary for sustainable democracy and economic development, as well as include programs to transform the relationship between the previously conflicting groups into positive,

productive relations (e.g., conflict resolution training programs in the schools).

- **Keep a long-term perspective when looking for results**. Even when conflict resolution training/seminars do not seem to have any short-term impact on resolving the conflict, years later when an opening exists, those participants may be the ones to influence someone as important as Gorbachev (Maynes 1993:50). For example, Camp David veteran Harold Saunders participated for years in informal conferences between Russians and Americans that had no appreciable impact at top political levels. However, when Gorbachev decided to seek reconciliation with the West, many of the people he turned to for advice and proposals were veterans of those conferences. Likewise, Saunders has noted that today nearly all the Palestinian delegates to the Middle East peace talks are graduates of similar programs (Cullen 1993:53-4).

Although some of these lessons may seem basic and self-evident, past and current ethnic conflict resolution projects and programs have demonstrated that many lessons are not being transferred to proposed projects and programs.

2.3. Sector-Specific Lessons

The following sections attempt to organize lessons learned by sector, paying particular attention to donor assisted strategies and results. Although many lessons overlap and sometimes contradict each other, they represent a wealth of experiential and methodological outcomes. These principal lessons learned are organized according to the following sectors: (1) Political Development, (2) Economic Growth, and (3) Education.

Each of the three principal lessons learned is accompanied by a strategy table. The strategy tables give guidance to development policy and program/project professionals in their design of ethnic conflict projects, and examination of existing programs/projects for ethnic and conflict impact. They are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather to serve as a guide or a compilation of issues for development specialists. Moreover, many of the strategies overlap with the issues of the other strategies. For example, a discussion of natural resource use by ethnic communities (in Table 4) can not ignore the issue of land title and access (found under the land reform column in Table 4), nor can the issue of ethnic group rights (found on Table 3 under the human rights programs column) be neglected.

BOX 1: An Explanation of the Three Strategy Tables

The ethnic conflict resolution strategies presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are configured first in terms of the development problem to be dealt with (row 1), then the program purpose and longer term goal (rows 2 and 3). The fourth row shows the major project elements likely to be chosen by development professionals. Row 5 focuses on some examples of the potential repercussions of implementing the ethnic conflict resolution strategy. Row 6 lists some of the unresolved issues that continue to plague ethnic conflict theory and programs.

To illustrate, "Legal Systems Reforms" strategies (depicted in column 1 of Table 3), included in political development programs, are aimed at a legal system that denies access and redress to ethnically non-dominant groups. Accordingly, a project addressing this would have as its purpose (row 2) the increase of access and redress to the legal system for ethnically non-dominant, and in the long run would hope to end up with (row 3) a fair and equitable legal system. A USAID project in this context (row 4) would typically include components for alternative dispute settlement, conflict resolution training, and/or legal services. Potential repercussions of such projects (row 5) could be that the legal system may become overburdened with ethnically related claims and cease to function efficiently and effectively. And last, row 6 reveals that ethnically non-dominant groups' cultural differences (such as tribal courts) may have trouble being tolerated by the official legal system, much less being incorporated into the legal system.

2.3.1. Lessons Learned from Political Development Programs for Conflict Resolution

Perhaps the most important cross-cutting lesson garnered from an analysis of project and historical material is that **political will** plays the pivotal role in successful ethnic conflict resolution (Maynes 1993:26; Bitner 1992:7). Without the support of political leaders, including leaders of ethnic non-dominant and marginalized groups, resolution is impossible; and even with their support resolution is still problematic. Leaders, however, often have limited freedom to choose their own paths. Indeed, since elite competition is often a source of ethnic conflict, it is important to be attentive to the elite rationale for promoting any political change (Horowitz 1985:573).

On the other hand, if donors wait around for sufficient political will, they may be waiting for a very long time, and ethnic communities could suffer tremendously. If donors find insufficient political will, should they "just pack up?" If there is sufficient political will, do donors really need to get involved? And by getting involved, donor actions may actually reduce the political will since they will be focused on empowering weaker parties. Rather, donors need to understand where all the parties to the conflict stand, including the elite, and then assist with the most appropriate interventions. If political elites or other strong interest groups support the effort, then the intervention might be easier. If political elites do not support the conflict resolution effort, then donors need to include them in the dialogue so that they understand how their interests can be served through conflict resolution.

Within the category of political development, the identified lessons learned fall into six major subcategories: (1) Legal Systems Reform Efforts; (2) Political, Civil, and Human Rights Concerns; (3) Electoral Systems; (4) Decentralization; (5) Regional Arrangements; and (6) Media. Each of these subcategories represents a particular strategy for addressing

ethnic conflict. It is important to note that all of these subcategories may be prejudicial to people and communities effectively outside of political/state institutions. Table 3 summarizes key aspects of each type of political development program detailed below.

2.3.1.1. Lessons from Legal Systems Reform Efforts

- **Use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to increase ethnic groups' access to legal processes**. Often, emerging legal frameworks of newly democratized states cannot be expected to cope with the many disputes and disagreements that arise during times of rapid change and the collapse of old structures. When legal literacy rises in these states and more people become aware of and assert their rights under the law -- often expressed as ethnic minority rights -- the formal legal system can become overburdened. Conflict resolution and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs can help relieve some of the pressure on nascent legal systems (ConflictNet 1992:27) (Appel 1993:1). Thus, while the establishment of an effective rule of law may spark conflict, in the long run an effective rule of law is undeniably beneficial.

  Case: In *Australia* an ADR program that has proven successful in some situations is the establishment of Community Justice Centers. Indeed, 15-20 percent of all disputes are settled during the case information intake process alone. These centers employ multilingual staff to handle intake, use interpreters when necessary, and recruit and train mediators representing the range of national and ethnic backgrounds (Fisher/Long 1991:33).

- **Implement court and administrative proceedings in the language of those involved**. Often, access to and transparency of the judicial system is limited to those who speak an official language, which leaves ethnic groups who speak a different language outside the legal system. This can lead ethnic groups to believe that the legal redress system is not available to them, and therefore to consider violence as a response. Wherever possible, court systems and administrative proceedings must be carried out in the mother tongue of the person involved (Unterberger 1992:15). When this is not feasible, translators might be a solution.

  Case: In *South Tyrol* all official court and administrative proceedings were carried out in Italian, despite a German-speaking majority. This led the dominant group to seek the assistance of Austria to address their grievances. Now official proceedings are carried out in Italian and/or German.

2.3.1.2. Lessons from Political, Civil, and Human Rights Programs

- **Use caution when promoting constitutional reform programs, as such reform can either mitigate or exacerbate ethnic conflict**. Constitutional engineering strategies can provide opportunities for creating new institutional arrangements, such as federalism, for protecting ethnic minority rights, and for power sharing among different ethnic groups. This process can also provide incentives for politicians to promote accommodation among groups and build coalitions across ethnic lines in the competition for political office and at every branch and level of government (Lee Walker 1993:18; Peterson/Sayari 1992:16). On the other hand, if ethnic issues are ignored in the early stages of constitution building, democratization may damage ethnic group relations rather than ease tensions (de Nevers 1993:43).

- **Encourage constitutional arrangements to include ethnic issues before ethnic conflict becomes apparent**. Innovations in fostering democracy and reducing conflict should be adopted before the disruptive consequences of conflict become apparent, otherwise programs to reduce ethnic conflict are too narrow and too late. In particular, constitutional arrangements to reduce ethnic conflict at the time of independence are extremely important (Horowitz 1985:683).

  Cases: In *Nigeria* if the 1978 constitutional arrangements had been institutionalized earlier, the coups of 1966 might have been averted (Horowitz 1985:683).

  Similarly, in *Sri Lanka* the 1978 constitution followed seven years of conflict with the Tamils. Had the new constitution come first, the governmental action to which the Tamils reacted would probably not have occurred, nor would have the resulting armed conflict (Ibid .).

- **Be aware that definitions of citizenship are strong foci for ethnic group conflict**. New states often redefine their legal concept of citizenship and sometimes take the opportunity to exclude certain ethnic groups by defining them as foreign nationals rather than as citizens (Maynes 1993:33, Park et al., 1991:20). This process can increase ethnic group competition for resources and rights, as well as create immense legal problems regarding land ownership, voting rights, public sector employment, and other critical issues.

  Case: Today's *Germany* continues a troubling tradition that makes it very difficult for non-Germans to receive German citizenship. The law brands all foreigners in Germany as not "belonging" -- as aliens -- and so encourages ethnic tension (Maynes 1993:33).

- **Focus on group rights instead of individual rights in certain instances**. Many experts assert that ethnic rights are most likely to be protected in consociational societies that provide a high degree of "segmental autonomy so that each community has a considerable degree of freedom to run its own internal affairs" (Ryan 1990a:17, Coakley 1992:354, Maynes 1993:14).

  Case: In the former *Yugoslavia* the initial recognition of group rights worked because the state had not yet fully recognized individual rights.

  The formal recognition of ethnic and cultural differences, however, could be an important instrument of their elimination. This can happen when the majority of group-oriented ethnic policies have been premised on the inequality of the groups concerned, and have resulted in the perpetuation of these inequalities, "whatever the stated intent of these policies" (Coakley 1992:355). Furthermore, in certain cases a focus on the recognition of group rights may not only interfere with the exercise of individual rights, but may also immobilize the state (Ibid .). Carole Nagengast of the University of California-Irvine suggests that group rights may offer a means for ensuring respect for human rights in certain cases, but that, when group rights come into conflict with individual rights, individual rights should take precedence (Walker/Stern 1993: 10).

  Case: Again, in the former *Yugoslavia* a complex "ethnic veto" system developed and the federal government lacked sufficient executive powers to make comprehensive and authoritative decisions, which immobilized the state.

- **Emphasize civic education programs that are essential to the democratization process and to the reduction of ethnic conflict.** Protecting ethnically non-dominant group rights through civic education, as well as through legal and constitutional arrangements, is a difficult and lengthy process, but it is an essential task (Peterson/Sayari 1992:16).

TABLE 3: ETHNIC CONFLICT STRATEGIES: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

TYPE OF STRATEGY	Legal systems reform	Human rights programs	Electoral systems reforms	Decentralization programs	Regionalization programs	Civil Society Programs	Co In I
Development problem	Ethnic group access and redress denied	Citizenship and group rights denied, unequal, or abused	Government not representative of ethnic groups	Ethnic conflict at the domestic power center	Ethnic conflict on the periphery	Marginalized ethnic groups	Inf bia eth
Program purpose	Increase access and redress for ethnically non-dominant groups	Decline in discrimination and abuse	Greater ethnic representation and issues on national agenda	Increase non-dominant group representation in local government	Decrease importance of border disputes	Ethnic group empowerment	Alt sou for ava
Long-term goal	Fair and equitable legal systems	Secure human and group rights	Fair and diverse representation	Reduced ethnic conflict at the center	Reduced ethnic conflict on the periphery	Equal opportunity society	Et pr in sou
Project elements	ADR, conflict resolution training, non-dominant group languages used in legal processes, legal system strengthening, legal services and info. training	Constitutional reforms, civic education, monitoring and reporting ethnic group violations, advocacy for ethnic group rights	Civic education, League of Women Voter-type support, comparative studies, participatory training, elections monitoring, TA for electoral reform	Local govt strengthening (village council, urban council, municipal levels)	Seminars, conferences, participatory training, support to regional organizations	Adult literacy, conscientization, civic education, PVO-NGO grants, conflict resolution training	Co lut po ing inv jou tra
Potential repercussions	Overburdened legal system	Inequalities defined in constitution and ingrained	Dominant out-voting non-dominant groups, non-dominant issues dropped at national level or ethnicity usurps national polity	Increase ethnic conflict at the local level	Increase international tensions	Non-dominant group backlash, dominant group backlash	Co inf sou eth
Unresolved issues	Ethnically non-dominant cultural differences incorporated or tolerated by the official legal system	Individual versus group rights	Minority representation in a majoritarian system	Central governments concerns over losing power to local government	National government concerns over losing control over ethnic groups	Demosclerosis, rent seeking behavior of more powerful of the ethnically non-dominant groups	Fa tio evie

2.3.1.3. Lessons from Electoral Systems Programs

- **Supporting an election can sometimes be an effective conflict resolution device in a deeply polarized society.** Legitimate government reconciliation and peaceful democratic transition can emerge from the electoral process if there are incentives for cooperation and accommodation that bridge cleavages among different ethnic groups (Maynes 1993:12; Peterson/Sayari 1992:16; Nordlinger 1972:21).

  Case: Following independence in *Malaysia*, the Malays and Chinese established a joint consultative executive, the Alliance Party. This coalition gathered before each national election and agreed to a common electoral slate, although the political parties preserved their distinct organizational identities and power basis (Ibid .).

  An election can also exacerbate ethnic tensions, however, and encourage uncompromising attitudes and tempt the majority to stress outvoting members of the minority rather than reaching agreement with them (de Silva 1986:377; Brown/Schraub 1992:159; J. Walker 1993:104). For, as Stephen Ryan argues, an election "promotes decision-making without sensitivity to the realistic limits of policy" (Ryan 1990:33). Indeed, ethnic tensions "have generally occurred whenever governments have stressed majoritarian principles to the point of denying the legitimacy of cultural pluralism" (de Silva 1986:377).

  Cases: In *Guyana* and *Trinidad* political parties are defined by ethnicity (East Indian and African in these cases) and elections act as a population census and benefit the party with the demographic majority (Horowitz 1985:319-329).

- **Promoting districting programs can be one of the most powerful -- and controversial -- policy tools available in reducing ethnic conflict.** Electoral districting to incorporate different ethnic groups into distinct districts can be effective in reducing ethnic conflict and reducing the chances that majority rule will override minority rights. If possible, the success of regional and national leaders should be made dependent on support from other ethnic groups (de Nevers 1993:33). With such districting, mainstream politicians are unlikely to perceive political advantage in adopting extremist positions.

  The danger in promoting districting as an instrument in ethnic conflict reduction is that when electoral districts are small and homogeneous, conflict may be unresolved in electoral competition because electoral systems "diminish the diversity of representation" (Peterson/Sayari 1992:13). That is, each election consolidates political issues, causes parties to compromise more

extreme views (non mainstream views), and reduces the number of issues on the national agenda to the most major issues. The result is that non-dominant group issues can disappear from the national agenda, cause non-dominant groups to abandon the electoral and party process, and promote the expression of those non-dominant group interests through alternative processes, including violence. **The key concept is that elections of any kind work only if they are seen as a legitimate way to resolve disputes.**

> Case: In *El Salvador* the winner-takes-all climate of the political process has diminished tolerance towards defeated parties and minority views (Creative Associates 1993:6).

- **Emphasizing power-sharing policies can sometimes mitigate ethnic conflict**. Where religious and ethnic divisions have deep historical roots, political stability can been ensured by a deliberate lowering of expectations on both sides of the divide through devices such as proportionally held key electoral positions (de Silva 1986:376). This occurs when party leaders make post- or pre-election deals that accord the defeated parties a place at the decision-making table. This can give ethnic groups more autonomy and keep large majorities and coalitions from overriding minority issues (de Nevers 1993:34). Moreover, these power-sharing policies suggest that, regardless of election results, the numerically weaker party will retain a voice in domestic politics (Maynes 1993:31).

  > Cases: Both *Austria* and *Malaysia*, radically different societies, have reduced bitter ethnic or religious conflicts through a political process of "negotiated outcomes" (Ibid .).

- **Setting up supervised elections may be an important conflict resolution device**. Members of the Carter Center suggest that internationally supervised elections may serve as an alternative to direct talks or direct mediation of ethnic conflict. Indeed, elections "may be an important instrument for resolution of future conflicts" (Mawlawi 1992:410).

  > Case: In *Zambia* conflicting parties unwilling to negotiate an end to the conflict were willing to have an international body supervise their electoral process (Ibid .).

- **Transferring information on other election systems can benefit new democracies**. Western-style democracy may not be the right system for a development process that must telescope centuries of change into a few years (Maynes 1993:63). Providing knowledge about alternative political and institutional arrangements and comparing information on different conflict management practices could be very valuable (Peterson/Sayari

1992:16). This comparison would be even more valuable if countries in similar socio-economic circumstances were included.

2.3.1.4. Lessons from Decentralization Programs

- **Be alert that decentralization policies can reduce ethnic conflict tensions, but not without generating conflict in the process**. High levels of central government intervention signify that the stakes involved in political contests and in ethnic struggles are much greater than they would have been in a more decentralized, "privatized," society in which jobs, careers, status and even survival are less dependent on central governmental decision (Gasiorowski et al., 1990:6).

  However, shifting administrative and political burdens to the regional level during the decentralization process can increase competition between political groups. The regional political leaders can be forced to select regional ministries on the basis of "ethnic arithmetic" instead of ability or reputation (Maynes 1993:161).

  Likewise, establishing regional governments through the process of decentralization inevitably calls for reducing the powers of central ministries, none of which can be expected to accept a diminution of their own political and administrative authority (de Silva 1989:319). Even more important, when ethnic political parties make establishing a federal system one of their main issues, decentralization becomes acutely controversial (Ibid.). Specialists in ethnic conflict note that federal solutions can promote secession or partition and even greater intolerance toward the minority groups left behind.

- **Focus on bottom-up approaches to decentralization as this type of program works best to reduce ethnic conflict.** Devolution of power to units larger than a district or province is perceived as threatening smaller minorities in areas in which larger minorities would be likely to dominate the affairs of the territory including economic and political resources (de Silva 1986:374). A more reliable method of decentralization is the empowerment of local government institutions at the municipal and urban council levels, and village council levels (Ibid.). Devolution of power assumes some degree of state capacity; thus, some degree of top-down decision-making is necessary even when decentralization is approached from the bottom up.

  Cases: In *South Tyrol*, where the Italians and the Austrians worked out many of their issues, the minority non-dominant group, the Ladini, were given short shrift in the resolution process (Magnarella 1993). Likewise, ethnic groups compete among each other for access to resources, including donor assistance. For example, the Bidan, Haratine, and Halpulaar-en

in *Mauritania* and *Senegal* compete for land around the Senegal River (Park et al., 1991: ix).

- **Consider the location of non-dominant group's regions within the state when designing or implementing programs, because location is an important factor for decentralization programs.** If ethnic groups are located in different parts of the state, then regional autonomy or self-rule may be an option (de Nevers 1993:34). Autonomy is a valid policy option, unless the non-dominant group demanding autonomy is close to the national border -- in which case any level of autonomy increases fears that this would spur separatist pressure (de Silva 1986:374); central governments are unlikely to grant autonomy if this is the case.

- **Remember that decentralization efforts take a great deal of time and continuous commitment**. Establish a long time-frame agenda to allow the government to **gradually** pass measures on non-dominant group rights and decentralization. Attempting to force decentralization too quickly could backfire on both the donor agencies and on the groups in conflict. It also helps if the non-dominant group has an international sponsor, such as another state or the United Nations, to keep pressure on the government to follow the agenda (Unterberger 1992:13-14).

  Case: In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly and the pressure of international attention moved Italy, Austria and *South Tyrol* to agree on a package of measures to provide South Tyrol with a broad measure of autonomy and the rights of linguistic groups. This package included a "Calendar of Operations" for the measure's implementation. After 31 years, the final legislation was passed in 1992 and the dispute ended. At least part of the reason for the long time span was the changing Italian government; it took a while for each new government to get to the South Tyrol issue on its legislative calendar.

2.3.1.5. Lesson from Regional and Transnational Programs

- **Examine regional and transnational arrangements as potential ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms.** Regional organizations can play a constructive role in sorting out ethnic conflicts, provided that the national government does not feel threatened (Maynes 1993:34). Some analysts believe that traditional definitions of nation-states are incapable of containing ethnic groups (Danforth 1993; Saunders 1993b:4). Nation-states are, by some definitions, the collection of members of one ethnic group, yet many states have borders that split ethnic groups between two or more nation-states. One answer to the conceptual problem of nation-states being

unable to encompass an entire ethnic group is to encourage people to focus on their identity with an entire region, rather than within one state. Thus, one of the overall aims of ethnic conflict resolution efforts, according to President Clinton's advisor Jenonne Walker, is to establish relationships with regional organizations and arrangements to decrease the importance of national borders (J. Walker 1993:106, Maynes 1993:32).

Cases: In 1990, the *Macedonians* sent a transnational delegation to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meetings on national minorities. This delegation was made up of representatives from the Republic of Macedonia, from Macedonian minority communities in the Balkans, and from Macedonian diaspora communities abroad. The CSCE meeting furnished a regional minority group a forum for political activity that they did not have within the nation-state context. This de-territorialization of ethnic conflict, however, challenges the nation-state system as "transnational national communities" are becoming increasingly important participants in national struggles around the world.

Likewise, in the case of *South Tyrol*, Austria's growing closeness to the European Community decreased the importance of the border between Italy and Austria, and allowed Austria to negotiate successfully with Italy on the status of South Tyrol.

2.3.1.6. Lessons from Information, Communication, and Media Programs

- **Be aware that the media itself can be an agent both for and against ethnic conflict resolution**. "The media mediates conflict, whether it intends to or not" (Baumann/Sievert 1993:28). It defines, shapes, and often exacerbates conflict by the stories covered, by those omitted, by the sources used, and more. The conflict resolution potential of the media is almost universally unacknowledged and underutilized. The skills of exploring options and adding positive viewpoints to the agenda are new tools for the media as mediator (CRNN 1991:22).

  Case: In *South Africa* a major Cape Town daily sent reporters to the Guguletu township to report on the local reaction to the Pan Africanist Congress' military wing Azanian People's Liberation Army. The paper reported comments from patrons of a local bar and did not use the more moderate quotations -- which became a "powder-keg of hostility" and ignited further violence (Baumann/Siebert 1993:28).

One of the major problems in ethnically divided states is government control (or in some cases partisan ownership) of the communication of news, com-

mentary, documentary, and entertainment which can aggravate ethnic conflict. A free and unbiased mass media is an essential key to democracy.

Case: Also in *South Africa* a national magazine committed to dialogue and reconciliation, together with an NGO involved with mediation and mediation training, have initiated a Mediation and Conflict Training for Journalists Project. This project intends to make journalists more sensitive to conflict dynamics, the impact of reporting, and the potential for promoting conflict resolution (Ibid .:29).

- **Include international communications agencies in ethnic conflict resolution efforts**. In areas riven by ethnic conflict, the media can be used by those who want to incite civil unrest. When unrest breaks out, some ethnic group leaders may attempt to curtail the media's freedom so that communications between groups are cut and information sources are limited to the "correct" perspective.

  Case: Using Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to promote peace in *Eastern Europe*, especially directing programs towards young people, has been suggested as a way to provide alternative information (Skoric 1993:12).

- **Promote alternative information and communication sources to help mitigate ethnic conflict**. The media is not the only possible source of information; alternative information sources can include public libraries, NGO information centers, academic libraries, and international networks of computer bulletin boards. Likewise, alternative communication resources can assist ethnic groups by linking them with international support groups and knowledge sources outside the country.

  Cases: The now classic example of the power of information over conflict is the *Chinese* government massacre of citizens near Tianamen Square in 1989. After the massacre, Chinese students transmitted the most detailed, vivid reports of the incident almost instantaneously by fax, telephone and computer networks to activist throughout the world (Frederick 1992:8).

  In *South Africa*, a breakthrough in relations between black communities and a white-controlled local government agency was negotiated by an African NGO (the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) with the end-result that library services were provided to the black community (Baumann/Siebert 1993:32).

2.3.2. Lessons Learned from Economic Growth Programs for Conflict Resolution

As the basis for conflict shifts toward economic and resource issues, the economic stakes rise and the perception of zero-sum outcomes becomes more prevalent (Rothstein 1992:23). Likewise, many ethnic conflict experts suggest that "there is no evidence to suggest that economic development can mitigate ethnic conflict -- it may perhaps even exacerbate it" (Peterson/Sayari 1992:15). When policies that seek to distribute resources change the ethnic balance of economic opportunities and rewards -- usually though investment or preference schemes -- this issue must be addressed (Horowitz 1985:596).

The fact is that economic development has not been shown to mitigate ethnic conflict, at least in the short term. Because economic development is not the same as equitable development -- and economic disparity is often a precondition for ethnic conflict -- this relationship can be enigmatic. If economic disparities, access to and control over resources, and constraints on economic participation are conditions that lead to conflict, then appropriate economic development would seem to be helpful. Possible explanations for this seeming paradox include: any changes in the distribution of resources and access are sure to be disruptive -- even if more equitable -- and could encourage a short-term increase in ethnic conflict; the rate and distribution of growth can generate conflict; and the nature and type of economic development strategies employed could increase the tensions between groups -- if the economic investment is extractive in nature, particularly if it fails to include investment in the human capital in non-dominant group areas.

Within the economic growth category the identified lessons fall into four subcategories: (1) investment promotion; (2) creation of equal access; (3) labor; and (4) land settlement policies. Each of these subcategories represents a particular strategy for addressing ethnic conflict. Table 4 summarizes the key aspects of each type of strategy.

2.3.2.1. Lesson from Investment Promotion Programs

- **Promote investment in non-dominant group areas as a way to reduce ethnic conflict**. Economically weak and dependent regions are prone to violent ethnic conflicts (Carment 1993:144). Therefore, steering investment and capital improvements to regions and communities populated by ethnically non-dominant groups can help alleviate tensions. This strategy can include opening health clinics, building bridges to link isolated non-dominant group areas with the rest of the country, job training programs, and improving schools (Hirschoff 1993:13).

  Case: In *Senegal* the government built a bridge over the Gambia River to connect the isolated southern region to the rest of the country and generate new jobs there (Ibid.)

TABLE 4: ETHNIC CONFLICT STRATEGIES: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

TYPE OF STRATEGY	Business Opportunities	Employment Programs	Land Reforms	Natural Resource/ Environment Programs
Development problem	Ethnically non-dominant group not included in economic decision making	Discrimination (both public and private)	Ethnically non-dominant group lacks access to or legal title to land	Ethnically non-dominant group's access to and control over NR denied
Program purpose	Increase ethnically non-dominant group's participation	Fair representation in labor force	Secure ethnically non-dominant group's access to land	Increase ethnically non-dominant group's participation in decision making
Long-term goal	Fair participation in economic decision making	Fair participation in employment	Secure access and title to land	Balanced decisions between sustainable development and ethnically non-dominant group's control over NR
Project elements	Preferential treatment (investment, business licenses, contracts, shares, loans), training programs	Structural adjustment programs and social safety nets, microenterprize development, training programs	Resettlement programs, legal title reforms, migration programs, land reform	Civil society, participatory rural appraisals, community based forestry, protection-respect of traditional practices and knowledge[11]
Potential Repercussions	Backlash from those left out (dominant groups, subgroups, etc.), less economically sound decisions/outcomes	Backlash from dominant groups, subgroups left out, positions not advertized	Increased ethnic conflict between subgroups, other groups	Increased tensions between different ethnic groups or subgroups
Unresolved Issues	Economically sound decisions versus equitable or preferential treatment, short-term economic priorities versus long-term social priorities, incentives versus quotas	Public sector usually emphasized over private sector employment practices, when quotas will end	Different methods or laws for title can exist in same area (religious verses historic precedent), what is government's real reason for resettlement	Exploitation of NR verses ethnically non-dominant group's cultural use of NR verses environmentalist conservation use of NR, compensation

[11] For an explanation of traditional natural resource practices and indigenous non-dominant groups, see Chapter 4 in "Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity" (Biodiversity Support Program 1993:57).

Any assumption that all potential investors are equal, however, and have equal access to investment funds would doom any strategy to failure. It is important to recognize that a market economy may actually support one ethnic group over another (Peterson/Sayari 1992:15). Likewise, it is vital to watch out for resource extraction investment projects that may generate very little employment and the benefits of such investment may accrue to other parts of the state -- or even outside the state.

2.3.2.2. Lesson from Programs that Secure Access Equality

- **Be aware that, while the promotion of equality of economic access can ease ethnic conflict, it can also create problems.** Using quotas for hiring and giving preference in government jobs are common tactics of states to ease ethnic conflict (Hirschoff 1991:12). Affirmative action programs can benefit not just a weak non-dominant group, but also the educationally disadvantaged or regionally remote areas of the country (Suberu 1993:52). This policy can backfire, however, if other groups resent the special treatment that one group is getting (Hirschoff 1991:12). Some organizations have responded to hiring quotas or preferences by not advertising vacancies, filling vacancies with temporary workers, and other means of circumventing affirmative action policies.

  Changes in public sector employment practices (such as quota hiring) point to two issues: those losing positions see it as new discrimination; those gaining employment see it as a reversal of past discrimination (de Silva 1986: 366). Donald Horowitz recommends that economic incentives, for both private and public sector organizations to bring non-dominant groups into the job market, work better than quotas (Walker/Stern 1993:18)

  > Case: In *South Tyrol*, where a quota system for public employment has been legislated, Italians are claiming to be German in order to get public sector jobs (Magnarella 1993).

2.3.2.3. Lesson from Labor Programs

- **Be aware that ethnic divisions of labor complicate ethnic conflict resolution efforts**. Ethnic groups that coexist in the same state often coincide with a cultural division of labor, with some ethnic groups filling mainly lower-paid and less prestigious jobs. The more frequently members of the non-dominant group occupy distinctive, high status positions in the labor force, the more likely they are to be seen as a threat to the dominant group and the greater the pressure on the state to withhold group rights from them. If the non-dominant group is associated with a low social status its

culture tends to be stigmatized and acculturation (or lack thereof) usually occurs (Coakley 1992:353).

2.3.2.4. Lesson from Land Settlement Programs

- **Be cautious of land reform policies that can exacerbate ethnic conflict**. Existing patterns of land tenure reflect complex compromises among socioeconomic and ethnic groups. Land reform will alter the status quo and most likely lead to overt conflict. Donors must exercise caution since the rationale for a reform may be articulated in technocratic and/or theoretic terms by a government, but the underlying agenda may be to benefit or disadvantage a particular ethnic group. The motivations behind the development rhetoric need to be closely and critically examined (Park et al., 1991:i).

  Case: There are many such cases, as almost all development projects alter property rights. For example, in *Mauritania* problems exist between some ethnic groups asserting land rights based on conquest and others basing claims on the Islamic principle of *indirass*, or rights established through the clearing of land (Park et al., 1991).

2.3.2.5. Lesson from Natural Resource Management Programs

- **Be aware that economic control over natural resources can be a tremendously contentious area**. Conflict over natural resources can occur between and among ethnically non-dominant groups, governments, land development groups, and even donors. Therefore, natural resource decision-making should include all those groups in order to be effective in reducing conflict. "The participation of citizens in community-based organizations involved in natural resource management can contribute to alleviation of environmental problems, while at the same time enabling people to become involved in the national decision-making process" (Green Guidance 1993). Moreover, support and respect for locally based expertise and indigenous knowledge can offer important insights into land use issues, generating changes in resource management and improving the lives of local people.

  Cases: In *Asia* sharply increased military expenditures have been attributed not only to internal conflicts, but also to fears about future conflicts over oil and fishing rights in the ocean (Rothstein 1992:25). For example, Buddhist monks in *Thailand* have come to the aid of hill tribes to protect forest resources. These "green monks" have been arrested by the government for promoting civil unrest.

  In the *Middle East*, future "water wars" are expected to diminish the possibilities of significant reductions in military spending. For example,

fears about the economic viability of the *West Bank and Gaza* due to population pressures and natural resource deterioration have played a part in raising Israeli doubt about the stability of the Palestinian state (Ibid.).

2.3.3. Lessons Learned in Education Programs for Conflict Resolution

Within the category of educational programs, the identified lessons fall into four subcategories: (1) securing equality of access; (2) selecting the language of instruction; (3) developing the educational curriculum; and (4) selecting and training educators. As with the earlier sections, Table 5 summarizes key aspects of the four educational strategies detailed below.

TABLE 5: ETHNIC CONFLICT STRATEGIES: EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

TYPE OF STRATEGY	Access Equality Programs	Democracy in the Schools
Development problem	**Ethnic community not participating (fully) in the education system**	**Ethnic issues and culture not included in school system**
Program purpose	**Bring ethnically non-dominant groups into the education system and decision-making process**	**Increase "respect" for and understanding of ethnic groups**
Long-term goal	**Equitable education system**	**Ethnic issues included in national decision-making**
Project elements	**Language of instruction, school placement, participation (quotas, testing, admission requirements), civic education**	**Curriculum development, civic education, conflict resolution training, democratic classroom/school environments, teacher/PTA/board training, student exchange programs**
Potential Repercussions	**Increase in ethnic conflict, corresponding access to employment not provided, backlash from preferential treatment, increased enrollment in private or foreign schools**	**Ethnic identity subsumed by national identity**
Unresolved Issues	**Results of ethnically integrated classes are mixed**	**Nationalism verses ethnic identity**

2.3.3.1. Lessons from Programs to Secure Access Equality

- **Be aware that efforts to secure equality of access to the classroom have produced conflicting results**. States attempting to ameliorate ethnic conflict have tried with some success to regulate quotas for a non-dominant group's participation in education, especially at the university level. Likewise, it has also been found that, with education and training programs, it is better to mix people from different non-dominant groups in order to expose them to common problems and aspirations (USAID 1981:17). Limiting the classes to participants of a single ethnic group only serves to maintain or further exacerbate social cleavages. These policies can backfire if other groups resent the special treatment one group is getting (Hirschoff 1991:12).

  Other alternative policies designed to increase ethnically non-dominant group access to education can include: offering incentives to schools to include ethnically non-dominant students; making sure that ethnically non-dominant languages are included in the languages of instruction; and ensuring that schools are built in non-dominant group areas. Clive Harber suggests that political development programs that address ethnic and non-dominant group issues need to be introduced before contact is made between different groups. These programs should focus on the status of the different ethnic groups, each ethnic group must enjoy the support of those in authority, and the different ethnic groups must already be cooperating together in some meaningful way (Harber n.d.:8). Furthermore, national civic education programs could lay the groundwork for individual school civic education programs.

  Case: *Nigeria* established Federal Government Colleges in each of the states of the Nigerian Federation. These colleges accept an equal quota of students from each state so that each pupil is given the opportunity to work, play, and live together, "to learn to understand and tolerate one another and thereby to develop a horizon of one Nigeria" (Harber n.d.:8). Evidence suggests, however, that this program is not working and that in some states the level of ethnic mistrust and hostility in Federal Government Colleges was significantly higher than in the local, more ethnically homogenous schools.

- **Promote the use of "neutral" languages as a way to reduce ethnic conflict.** Linguistic tensions are a threat to the resolution of ethnic conflict within a state. A third or neutral language can serve as a link between the major ethnic groups and as a means of achieving social mobility (Gasiorowski; Hill 1993:62; USAID 1981; de Silva 1986:371; Hutchison 1993:6). This neutral language should not be identified with a particular

ethnic group, and especially should not be the dominant group language (Hill 1993:68).

Cases: In *Sri Lanka* English serves as a "link language," and both Tamil and Sinhalese languages are treated as equal throughout the country, whereas in Switzerland the four official languages are defined by separate regional areas. However, the Sri Lankan policy of bilingualism does not work in areas with a predominant majority group. For example, the Sinhalese see no reason to learn a regional language as a second language as opposed to English, which is an international language (de Silva 1986:371).

In *South Tyrol* the agreement between Austria and Italy called for equality of the two languages. This has meant that all court proceedings, decisions, and government documents have to be made available in both German and Italian. Furthermore, each ethnic group has the right to their own schools, but each ethnic group must also learn the other language (Magnarella 1993).

2.3.3.2. Lessons from Programs to Develop Democratic Principles in the School System

- **Be aware that civic education programs require long-term commitment in order to generate results.** It is possible for students to learn democratic principles through directed education and acquaintance with the way of life in the traditional democracies, including an acceptance of constitutional processes. However, this essential process of civic education is difficult and requires a long-term commitment on the part of governments and donors (Gasiorowski 1990:7) (Peterson/Sayari 1992:16).

- **Be cautious of civic education programs that attempt to assimilate ethnic non-dominant groups into the dominant culture**. Evidence suggests that efforts to enhance national awareness of ethnic cultures through the school system have been successful to a certain degree. Attempted methods have included incorporating messages relaying the need for national unity into school textbooks, using national symbols such as flying the national flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the national pledge. These efforts fail to address the needs of ethnic communities. Not surprisingly, evidence also indicates that schools employing these programs have been less than successful in creating national identity, with sizable non-dominant groups continuing to hold openly hostile and distrustful ethnic views (Harber n.d.:7).

- **Note the high potential of school curriculum as a tool for addressing ethnicity issues.** Curricula can be rewritten or developed to incorporate tolerance and respect for other cultures and ethnic identity.

  Case: In many *Eastern European* countries history textbooks are being rewritten. Educators have taken this opportunity to encourage cross-border research and writing teams to incorporate tolerance and respect for other cultures, to "sweep the hate" from textbooks (LaFranchi 1994:18).

- **Use democratic educational structures as role models for ethnic conflict resolution.** Classroom environment is considered important to the success or failure of educational strategies for conflict resolution. According to Clive Harber, the more democratic the classroom environment (e.g., pupils participate in decision making), the more likely it is that students will develop democratic attitudes, including support for gender, racial, and ethnic equality (Harber n.d.:11).

- **Promote ethnic harmony by carefully selecting and training ethnically non-dominant group teachers**. Selecting teachers from non-dominant groups can increase the chances of a successful training program. These non-dominant teachers can then serve as role models for students. The teachers' appreciation for non-dominant group cultures also increases (USAID 1981:18).

3. Toward Resolution of Ethnic Conflict Options

The previous section identified specific lessons learned in three development sectors -- economic, political and educational. Several cross-cutting options for USAID interventions in ethnic conflict resolution are addressed in concluding this paper. These options are tentative in nature because the Agency and other donors are just beginning to examine the possibility of actually addressing ethnic conflict in programming and projects; however, some guidance and suggestions have emerged through the process of conducting this research. This final section examines whether the United States should intervene in ethnic conflicts, how USAID should intervene, and what types of programs or projects should be emphasized.

3.1. Should the United States Intervene?

Should the United States be involved in ethnic conflict resolution? According to the American Friends Service Committee, calls for U.S. intervention in conflict resolution in the Balkans should be resisted because this intervention will deepen the conflict and "forestall the healing." They suggest that the United States cannot be an "honest broker" in peacemaking because of its past efforts to keep out of the conflict. Instead, the Quakers recommend the intervention of multinational organizations, such as U.N. peacekeeping forces, for humanitarian reasons only (AFSC 1992:4-5). This emphasis on multinational organizations and peacekeeping ignores the real potential of U.S.-led intervention in ethnic conflict **before** peacekeeping efforts are needed and after the peace has been established. However, no matter what the rational for U.S. intervention, it seems clear from signals from the public, Congress, the White House, and from the Department of State, that the U.S. will have to address ethnic conflict in some way. How, then, to approach ethnic conflict becomes the question to answer.

As analysts continue to discuss what role the United States can play in moderating ethnic conflict, various policy suggestions have emerged. Lois Peterson and Sabri Sayari note that time is an important factor in U.S. policy: "projects must show short-term gains for political reasons, but there should also be concern for long-term effects" (Peterson and Sayari 1992:14). They believe that the United States can play an important role in "promoting democracy in ethnically divided societies" while objecting to the promotion of American-style "democratic values" (Ibid.:15-16). Promoting democracy in ethnically divided societies -- where definitions of democracy can depend on cultural, religious, historic, and ethnic foundations that vary within the nation-state and between sovereign states -- is a critical problem. The promotion of U.S.-style democracy can sometimes naively assume that other societies reflect the U.S. system. The dissemination of U.S.-based lessons learned in democracy, comparative analysis of democratic systems, suggestions, advice and technical assistance -- with the caveat that these are just information exchanges and not solutions -- can contribute in a positive way toward democratic development in ethnically divided societies. Peterson and Sayari, therefore, conclude that the United States should

concentrate on strategies that focus on constitutional engineering, civic education, electoral system reforms, and providing knowledge about alternative ethnic conflict resolution approaches. It is significant to note that these suggestions are the core of many USAID democracy programs.

Harold Saunders suggests that U.S. policy take a task-force approach to this problem. This would concentrate:

> *the creativity, imagination, energy, intelligence, and resources of individuals in the U.S. government on this problem in a way that would not cost extra money and would be far more satisfying and effective for the individuals involved than the current normal approach. Leaving each department and agency to run its own programs loses advantages of complementarity* (Saunders 1993a:25).

Furthermore, Saunders urges the U.S. government to work with NGOs in order to take advantage of the significant resources that lie outside government. Again, he notes that coordination of activity is important -- NGOs must work together rather than pursue projects in relative isolation from each other -- and should consult with governments during project planning and implementation stages (Ibid.:25-26). The Department of State Secretary's Open Forum Working Group on Conflict Resolution, Civil Society and Democracy already exists and seeks to coordinate information and activities of various U.S. agencies and NGOs working in those areas. Other interagency groups and fora either exist or are being instituted to deal with related issues.

As suggested in Section Two of this paper, (see Table 2), there are distinct intervention opportunities for U.S. agencies addressing ethnic conflict. The Department of State should take the foreign policy lead when ethnic conflict has internationalized and violence has occurred. The Department of Defense should take the lead when militaries need to be demobilized. [12] USAID should take the lead when the conflict is still domestic and violence is not present. Indeed, "preventive diplomacy" and "post-conflict reconstruction" easily fuse with traditional USAID projects and programs that concentrate on transforming relationships between ethnic groups through preventive actions and reconstruction. USAID can have a positive impact on ethnic conflict resolution both before violence erupts and after the violence has ended. USAID should work jointly with diplomatic organizations and agencies when the conflict internationalizes, and when the conflict becomes violent it should act as an advisor.

[12] It is interesting to note that many analysts point to the military as a major agent for increasing ethnically non-dominant groups' opportunities. For instance, universal conscription forces groups to live and work together when they would not do so under other circumstances.

3.2. How should USAID Intervene?

There are three potential areas for USAID ethnic conflict project activity: programs that focus on preventing ethnic conflicts; programs that address existing ethnic conflict; and programs that focus on post-conflict reconstruction.

3.2.1. USAID program activity should concentrate on preventive measures

"Once ethnicity is given primacy, there is no logical conclusion to fragmentation along ethnic lines: any cut-off point in the provision of institutional representation or independence will be arbitrary" (Hill 1993:68). Furthermore, once serious fighting begins it is almost impossible for outside organizations to intervene effectively until the conflicting groups have spent themselves (Maynes 1993:124; de Nevers 1993:33; Brown/Schraub 1992:204; Richardson 1993:11). Therefore, USAID's efforts should focus on mediating conflicts before they become violent -- before violence has created suffering, bitterness and a thirst for revenge (Williams 1992:21) -- and USAID should better monitor the impact of its development efforts to avoid contributing to conflict.

As noted throughout this paper, preventive measures can be focused on the traditional program and project areas in which USAID has built up a comparative advantage. To reiterate, these program areas are political development programs for ethnic conflict reduction, economic development programs for ethnic conflict reduction, and education programs for ethnic conflict resolution. Harold Saunders recently noted that prevention not only includes the concept of preventing the violent conflict in the first place, but also encompasses such concepts as preventing the further escalation of conflict, and preventing "backtracking" of resolution measures (Saunders 1993b).

3.2.2. USAID should not pass up opportunities that may arise during times of ethnic violence

International organizations should monitor violent ethnic conflicts for windows of opportunity that may open up. These windows can open if both groups simultaneously weaken, or if they temporarily decide that further violence could lead to a worse outcome (de Nevers 1993:33; Saunders 1993a:20). At this time, USAID could work with conflict resolution experts and U.S. Department of State officers to begin a dialogue process between the clashing ethnic groups. However, any real contribution by USAID in the dialogue process would be based on the assumption that USAID has been active in the host country long enough to know the players and relevant background of the current conflict, and to have established relationships with political and community leaders within the country. During these often sensitive negotiations, USAID should remain responsive to: the levels of publicity the ethnic groups can support in order to keep tentative resolution efforts alive; the potential impact on its programs and projects in the country and in the

region; the potential for putting USAID staff, contractors, and in-country liaisons at risk; and the potential for being able to make a positive contribution to the conflict situation.

3.2.3. USAID can play a positive role in post-ethnic-conflict resolution

Once the conflict is "resolved" or an acceptable solution/agreement is reached, donors can begin the process of rebuilding democratic and economic institutions and capacities. These nation building, or, better yet, nation re-building programs have certain requirements. These include the long-term commitment of USAID in order to repair damage (both physical and psycho-social); special attention to rebuilding positive relationships between the former enemies; and addressing the friction between immediate survival needs and the need for gradual approach -- which builds political and economic capacity where none previously existed. USAID has already begun to support this type of nation building effort through the newly created Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Programs managed by OTI are envisioned to begin soon after negotiated settlements of protracted conflicts occur. These programs could include: the swift construction of democratic institutions; the demobilization of heavily militarized societies; the design of projects that address formerly disrupted economies and damaged infrastructures; and, a main focus on other humanitarian concerns, including projects to return displaced persons to their original territory.

3.3 USAID Intervention Options: Pros and Cons

After establishing the existence of opportunities for USAID intervention in ethnic conflict resolution exist, the next step is to translate those opportunities into program/project options. Option one examines the possibility of USAID taking on ethnic conflict issues by directing programming specifically towards the prevention and reduction of ethnic conflict. Option two examines the possibility of USAID addressing ethnic conflict issues indirectly by either adding an ethnic issues component to programming and projects, or by conditioning USAID assistance to target countries with requirements to address ethnic conflict.

3.3.1. OPTION 1 -- Direct Intervention

Direct intervention can occur in two ways. First, USAID can focus its program/project efforts directly on resolving ethnic conflict through pioneering, high risk, innovative programs with substantial investments to develop institutional capacity. Second, USAID can focus efforts directly through traditional, less risky, tried-and-true programs where USAID has already developed both institutional capacity and a comparative advantage. The advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches are described briefly below.

Ethnic Conflict-Specific Programs/Projects: USAID can address ethnic conflict directly through programs and projects that develop a new capacity for ethnic conflict resolution. Although USAID has little previous experience with conflict

resolution methodology and activity, the Agency can overcome this shortcoming by: (1) carefully identifying country experts, conflict resolution practitioners, and ethnic conflict experts; (2) collecting information on the NGO/PVO proposing to do the project, and calling other NGO/PVOs to establish the reputation of the implementing organization; (3) funding expert review of each proposal for relevance, sustainability, effectiveness, costs, and other key factors. Furthermore, because of pressures on USAID to produce results quickly and transparently, each ethnic conflict resolution project could be reviewed/evaluated throughout each project year in order to make adjustments and fine-tune the project to changing field circumstances.

> For example: In a USAID-assisted country where ethnic conflict has become entrenched, a project that seeks to identify and then address the sources of the conflict would be effective. The project could have components that address potential areas of conflict, such as a legal component that seeks to include all ethnic groups in the definition of a citizen.

Negative aspects of such a direct approach to conflict, which may put the entire USAID country program at risk, include: opposition from ethnic elites who control the allocation of resources in the nation-state; embarrassment of host governments that may have attempted reconciliation through programs which failed; damaging USAID's image of impartiality as the Agency, of necessity, favors certain ethnic groups over others in an attempt to address discrimination; and, increasing the chances that USAID may be involved in future violence.

Traditional Program/Projects with Ethnic Conflict Resolution as Program/Project Purpose: There is also a role for USAID in programs that directly address ethnic conflict issues but through traditional program/project areas, particularly those projects focused on preventive conflict activities and post-conflict reconstruction. A review of lessons learned discussed earlier in this report reveals that the traditional areas in which USAID has project experience and a comparative advantage include: education, training, legal systems reform, and economic growth. Ethnic conflict issues would, therefore, be addressed by designing, reformulating, or redirecting existing programs and projects to include ethnic conflict resolution goals, purposes and inputs.

> For example: Where the legal definition of citizenship has become an area of ethnic discrimination and potential conflict in a USAID-assisted country, the Bureau/Mission can respond by initiating or adding a legal system reform project which has a constitutional reform component to the country portfolio. Although ethnic conflict doesn't have to be specifically mentioned in the project description, the main goal would be to reduce ethnic conflict through changing the legal definition of citizenship to something more acceptable and inclusive.

An example from the literature: Peterson and Sayari suggested a specific education project which could be relevant to USAID's efforts in ethnic conflict resolution. They recommend the development of a type of "ethnic conflict best practices book" that would offer short country portraits of solutions, methods, and outcomes, "giving both positive and negative cases" from a wide variety of international efforts (Peterson/Sayari 1992:15). This "presentation of possibilities" could be simplified and translated into relevant languages so that policy makers and other leaders could benefit from the comparative knowledge of academic specialists.

Negative aspects of using traditional program areas to directly address ethnic conflict include: program/project managers may continue to use traditional indicators for program/project success that ignore new considerations of ethnic conflict; already hostile governments or ethnic groups may find "just cause" for increasing suspicions of USAID goals if an ethnic component is added to traditional program/project area; and, the resultant increase in program/project complexity and confusion could undermine any potential benefits of adding ethnicity to program/project goals.

3.3.2. OPTION 2 -- Indirect Intervention

Because of the sensitive nature of ethnic conflict interventions and the risks associated with ethnic conflict resolution programming, USAID may find indirect approaches to ethnic conflict more effective. Two indirect intervention approaches are described below.

Women in Development- (WID)-like project components which address ethnic conflict: Even if USAID decides that discrete ethnic conflict resolution projects will not be funded, a Women in Development (WID)-like approach to future programming could generate positive results. For example, each project could include an ethnic (and other non-dominant groups) component -- a methodology which examines and evaluates each program based on how it affects or could affect ethnic groups. This effort would examine not only the ethnic groups that may be included as targets of particular development activity, but also those groups that may suffer as resources are diverted to the target group. The potential for conflict which may erupt as ethnic groups compete with each other for limited donor resources could also be examined.

This WID-like approach to ethnic conflict could focus technical assistance on the design of ethnically sensitive programs and projects, ethnically inclusive monitoring and evaluation plans and systems, and ethnically responsive performance indicators. Likewise, such a program could include: the training of USAID staff and host country personnel to incorporate ethnic considerations into development efforts; applied research that explores the linkages between ethnicity and the development process; and, information and communications efforts to share research findings and

lessons learned from technical assistance and training activities to ensure that future programs and projects fully incorporate considerations of ethnicity.

> For example: A legal reform program would have to include an assessment of how each ethnic or non-dominant group could potentially be affected by changing the citizenship definition in the assisted country.

Some negative aspects of a WID-like approach to programs and projects include the very real possibility that required ethnic components could become more rhetorical than operative, and that including ethnic/non-dominant and gender issues as project components could limit the ability of USAID programs to deal with other cross-cutting issues.

Conditioning Assistance Based on Ethnic Conflict Efforts: USAID can condition assistance based on ethnically non-dominant rights and protection. The rationale for such conditioning would be to encourage policy changes that emphasize collaboration and strategic planning. At some point, such a negotiation process should include high-level officials, donor representatives, government policymakers, representatives of other institutions within USAID-assisted countries (e.g., churches, unions, business leaders), implementing officials, representatives of community groups (e.g., **ethnic group leaders**), and USAID staff.

> For example: the International Monetary Fund made *Slovak* leaders aware that democratic institutions and non-discrimination against their Hungarian minority were tacit conditions for continued financial support. Likewise, *Germany* conditioned the provision of economic benefits in bilateral agreements to special rights for ethnic Germans in eastern neighbors (J. Walker 1993:110).

Another possible technique USAID could use in project design is making aid conditional upon whether a recipient country addresses transborder ethnic issues. Development assistance for projects designed by two or more neighbors that share the same ethnic groups has great potential.

> For example: the use of economic inducements to promote *Hungarian* cooperation with *Slovakia* or *Romania*, or *Ukrainian* cooperation with *Moldova* (Ibid.:114).

Negative aspects of using conditionality to address ethnic conflict problems in USAID-assisted countries include: the inclusion of tranching as an element of the conditionality creates the potential for conflict between the political goals of U.S. foreign assistance; compliance with the conditions becomes a problem when

disbursing funds; [13] the inclusion of various decision-makers in the negotiation process inhibits positive outcomes given the nature of ethnic conflict; conditionality can also slow or kill projects that otherwise may be desirable; and, discontinuation or interruption of donor assistance creates a huge potential for backlash against ethnically non-dominant groups, and possibly against donors themselves.

4. Conclusion

In summary, USAID's involvement in countries confronting ethnic conflict -- or the potential for ethnic conflict -- is inevitable given the omnipresence of ethnic issues throughout the world. USAID must begin to address these issues in order to minimize the negative effects of ethnic conflict on its traditional program/project areas, and to maximize the positive effects of development planning in countries with extensive ethnic conflict. While USAID and other donor experience with ethnic conflict and conflict resolution is minimal, lessons learned and potential lessons learned do exist. These lessons have been extrapolated for this paper from academic, foundation, donor and NGO sources and provide an *infrastructure* for ethnic conflict resolution activity. Furthermore, because lessons learned tend to correlate with USAID's traditional program/project areas, ethnic conflict resolution programs could be an area in which USAID has a comparative advantage over other U.S. government agencies, donors and multilateral organizations.

The risks involved in ethnic conflict interventions are high, and USAID must be particularly sensitive to the context of the conflict. In the end, USAID's policy choice between direct or indirect intervention is, in some ways, dependent on external factors. That is, USAID's decision to become involved in ethnic conflict resolution will be determined by the humanitarian, political and economic concerns of the State Department and its agencies, the U.S. Congress and its constituents, various interest groups, including conflict resolution experts and organizations, international media coverage of conflict around the world and resulting public pressure for action, and the activities of other donors and multinational organizations.

[13] There is the "constructive engagement" problem -- if the borrower complies half way, does the donor pull the plug and lose influence, or stay in the game and accept some level of noncompliance.

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